National Embarrassment

Yesterday, the Egyptian president invited a few people with highly questionable intellectual abilities to attend one of his famous 'national dialogue' meetings about the highly sensitive issue of the Ethiopian dam. This warranted a quickly written, angry rant on my part. Although the issue is one pertaining to international law, global politics and Egypt's water and energy supplies, the attendees included people who lack any expertise in the aforementioned areas, among whom religious preachers and clergy members. For of course, as it has become the norm in Egyptian politics, one must always include a sheikh and a priest in every so-called national dialogue lest on think that Egypt has some sort of sectarian issue. After all, no matter how many churches are burnt down, no matter how many villagers are killed or displaced in sectarian fights, the image of the priest hugging the sheikh, their beards gracefully touching, is what makes everything ok in the end. Even better is when members of the three Christian denominations are invited, the more the merrier, national unity has never been truer.

But of course, the church representatives are there for a different reason as well, namely because one of the plans, in an attempt at so-called soft diplomacy, is to send Egyptian church representatives to pressure the Ethiopians to do Egypt's bidding. The Coptic and Ethiopian churches have strong historical and spiritual bonds and this, of course, means that Ethiopia would relinquish its own national interests in order not to upset the Pope.. at least that's how Egyptian 'intelligentsia' see it. I will no longer comment on this for there is still so much to say.

Now, I admit I haven't watched the entire meeting, partly because of how perplexed I was. After all, this is the first 'secret meeting' I've heard of that got aired on live television. Oh, I forgot to mention, the organizer, one of the president's female advisers (Oh yes, FEMALE, look at how modern and open the Muslim Brotherhood is!) apparently forgot to mention to the guests that their words would be brought to the living rooms of millions of viewers. So there they sat, surrounded by enormous TV-camera's talking about their secret plots, unaware of the embarrassment they were bringing to themselves and others.

Only later on during the meeting, when someone literally said "I swear that all that is said here will remain secret" before sharing his own fool-proof plan, did it occur to the president's clearly highly capable female adviser to point out that the meeting was being televised.. live. But it's not a big deal really, everyone is allowed some mistakes, except that the Muslim Brotherhood administration has been making use of that allowance quite a lot ever since they came to power.

The second reason I didn't watch the entire meeting is a personal problem. In Egypt, when people are angry and frustrated, they like to express that in an animated way by pointing out how their blood is boiling or how their gallbladder is about to burst. Out of concern for my internal organs and general health, I couldn't watch the whole thing. However, what I did see was the incompetence and ignorance that has typified the Egyptian 'elite' for the past years.

I am not going to write down what was said during those meetings, I am sure international media will take care of that, indulging you with the ingenious plots our beloved public figures came up with. There are just a few points I'd like to highlight.

Dear Egypt, you are not the smart kid in class. You see, Egyptians* have the tendency to see themselves as the masters of the universe, the Egyptian child is the smartest child in the world and all Arab people should be thankful to Egypt because without us teaching them everything they know, they would have been left prey to ignorance and despair. Africans must just look to Egypt with silent admiration, hoping to learn something from this great nation.

The funny thing is that one of the attendees pointed out that Egyptians do tend to look down on Africans and that this should be remedied. His suggestion was that a group of Egyptians should go to Ethiopia and ask them, in what undoubtedly would be a very humble tone, "What can we do for you?"

Instead of arrogantly asking about what you can do for those 'poor, underdeveloped countries' (as opposed to yourself, a country with a booming economy), dear Egypt, how about you do yourself a favor and spit out the 'elite' which has caused you nothing but embarrassment? Dismissing those who have been consistent only in being wrong while being oblivious to the amount of damage they caused with their faulty political analysis, is the first step to recovery. A humble realization of our strengths, but mostly also our weaknesses, is the way forward for our arrogance and our delusions have served us little. So instead of asking what you can teach others, dear Egypt, teach your own elite a lesson!

*Please spare me any mention of how I am generalizing. Yes, I should hope my readers realize that I wasn't speaking about every single one of Egypt's 90 something million people. 

The Last Summer of Reason

Exactly 20 years ago today, Algerian secularist writer and journalist Tahar Djaout was assassinated. He was an outspoken critic of Islamists and a proponent of secularism.

Today, the danger of those who would stifle freedom of conscience and freedom of speech is still very much apparent. People who dare to dissent, to voice their disagreement and use their pen as a weapon in the war of ideas are often in danger, their lives and their freedoms under threat. Let us never forget those who died because they wouldn't let threats stop them from speaking. Let us always remember those who wouldn't let darkness overshadow their light of reason. Let us keep the memory alive of those who bravely fought with the pen, even when the ink was their own blood.

I took the liberty of translating an excerpt from Tahar Djaout's book "The Last Summer of Reason". It was published after his death.

"He could easily have managed to lead a peaceful existence in this life, and, who knows, maybe also in the next. The warmth of the herd gives one safety, reinforces certainty and arms one against the iron hold of doubt. The herd shows you the way: it offers the illusion of the right path which leads you to paradise in a loud and uncivilized manner. The sheep which distances itself from the herd instantaneously becomes scabby. It is flooded with snarls and growls, with images of damnation, the rhetoric of curses which dogma mobilizes to punish intelligence and to distract from her questions.

The present brings with it much sadness. Piety has become the norm for greatness. Faith: a gravel desert with a fading face. He wanders between that desert of faith and the paradise of the books. The books, his old friends, filled with the invigorating power of dreams and intelligence together!

Now, at this moment, they have burned all his books in a cleansing fire. They recognize the danger of the words, all the words they can never tame or extinguish."

May he rest in peace.

English Summary of Constitutional Court Decision

Today, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court issued its decision regarding the constitutionality of the law which regulated the election of the Shura Council, Egypt's Upper House. This is the English summary of the ruling as it was published on Al Ahram newspaper.

1. Article 2.1 of the 2011 version of the Law nr. 120 of 1980 is unconstitutional.
2. Article 8.1 of that same law (as amended by the law nr. 109 of 2011) is also unconstitutional. This article gave both independents (not belonging to any party) and party members the right to run for seats reserved for individual voting (as opposed to electoral lists).
3. Article 24 of the same law is unconstitutional for providing that art. 9 bis a of the Law nr. 308 of 1972 re. the People's Assembly applies to the Shura Council as well.
4. This verdict is not to be implemented until a new Lower House is elected as article 230 of the Constitution stipulates.

The verdict is based on the controversial article 5 (which I mentioned in my article about the Dissolution of Egypt's Lower House a year ago) of the law nr. 120 of 2011 which stipulated that to run for the third of seats reserved for individual voting, the candidate had to be independent, thus not belonging to any political party. That article was later cancelled by law nr. 123 of 2011.

Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court

The Court clarified that its judgement is based on the old constitution, being the Constitutional Declaration which was issued on the 30th of March 2011 and amended by the declaration of 25 September 2011, as the new constitution isn't retroactively applicable. The old constitution being the one which was valid when the disputed articles were promulgated. The new constitution of 2012, in fact, goes in against the disputed law nr. 20 of 1980 because it states in article 231 that both independents and party members are allowed to run for all seats in parliament.

The Court continued saying that art. 38 of the Constitutional Declaration of 2011 which was applicable during the parliamentary elections stated that the electoral system would combine a system of electoral lists for two thirds and an individual system for the remaining third. The principle of equality and non-discrimination would suggest that this means that if only party members were allowed to run for the two thirds reserved for electoral lists, then independents should have been exclusively allowed to run for the remaining third of parliamentary seats. The system which allowed party members to run for all seats available while independents could only run for one third was deemed discriminatory and contrary to the principle of equal opportunity.

Therefore, the aforementioned parts of articles 2, 8 and 24 of the Law nr. 120 of 1980 were deemed unconstitutional by the Court.

The Court then mentions that since the people are sovereign and since they have voted upon the new constitution, it became the highest law in the land. This, regardless of whether that constitution fulfilled all aspirations or failed to do so in some aspects.

Therefore, the Court reconfirmed that, even though the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned articles leads to the invalidity of the Shura Council, the effects of that invalidity have been halted by the new constitution of December 2012. Article 230 of the new constitution specifies that the Shura Council takes over legislative powers until a new Lower House is elected at which point the legislative powers are transferred to the latter. A new Shura Council is to be elected within 6 months of the date of the first meeting of the new Lower House.

So the Shura Council remains the holder of legislative powers as article 230 of the constitution stipulates. After a new Lower House is elected, the effects of this verdict can take their course.


PS: You can read my analysis of the Court's Dissolution of Parliament last year here


Edit: emphasis added in bold for ease of reading

Why you got the Brotherhood wrong

“Just how scared should we be of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood? In numerical terms, it doesn't present much of a threat. Membership is in the low hundreds of thousands, and in a fair election, the Islamists would not be expected to win - in 2005, only 3% of the population voted for the Brotherhood.” Thus read a piece on Time magazine in November 2010, just two months before the start of the revolution that would topple Mubarak and, indeed, bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power. 

“The Muslim Brotherhood is a religiously conservative group. They are a minority in Egypt. They are not a majority of the Egyptian people, but they have a lot of credibility because of liberal parties have been a struggle for thirty years. They are in favor of a secular state. they are of –they are in favor of an institution that have bread lines, they are in favor that every Egyptian have the same rights, that the state is in no way a state based on religion. And I have been reaching out to them.” (sic) Words of El Baradei, as published on the 30th of January 2011, as protests were ongoing in Tahrir Square and elsewhere in Egypt.

 “There is no real danger that the revolution will be just the opening that Islamists need to take control.” And “Now there seems to be a concern that if President Hosni Mubarak leaves too soon, chaos will ensue and the Muslim Brotherhood could emerge as the biggest winner. But Egypt’s state structure is strong enough to withstand Mubarak’s ouster and there is no reason to think the protests will turn violent again.” Amr Hamzawi said on the 10^th of February, 2011, one day prior to the announcement by then vice-president Omar Suleiman that Mubarak has decided to step down.

Source: http://www.enumclaw.com/wp-content/uploads/Muslim-Brotherhood.jpg

Many have only recently started to realize how wrong they were when they supported the Muslim Brotherhood, hailing them as leaders on the forefront of a transition to democracy. Many analysts underestimated the group’s power and popularity, most importantly, they belittled any fears and worries about their threat. While many remain wary of loudly saying ‘mea culpa’, things in post-revolutionary Egypt have already revealed a lot. The Brotherhood’s undemocratic and illiberal practices are now being highlighted more than ever.

In this context, an honest discussion is needed in order to understand how and why so many got the Muslim Brotherhood wrong. It is useful to take a step back and consider how the group managed to use events to its advantage, convincing many that it was the right choice for those who believed in the stated goals of the Egyptian revolution. If anything is to be gained from Egypt’s failed democratic experiment, it should be an awareness of how an organization such as the Brotherhood was able to project an image of itself that later turned out to be a mere mirage. The goal is to avoid such public displays of deception from succeeding in the future.

There are two sides to the story. On the one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood has been able to fool both fellow countrymen as well as foreign analysts and politicians with talk about its plans for tolerance and inclusion. On the other hand, Western analysts have often thought and written about Egypt in such a fundamentally flawed way, that they themselves were particularly susceptible to being misled.  

I shall discuss a few aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy while also highlighting why it succeeded and why it was often received with such naiveté.

Firstly, the Muslim Brotherhood have a media team focused on its communications to the outside world. Apart from its famous Twitter account @Ikhwanweb, the Brotherhood also has a website in English which, contrary to what some might think, doesn’t simply contain translations of what the Brotherhood’s Arabic-language platform has to offer, but a tailored array of articles aimed to project a certain image to the Western reader. A couple of Twitter users, aware of the misleading nature of this arrangement, have recently started a new website in which they translate the actual Arabic content from official Muslim Brotherhood online outlets. That website is full of anti-semitic, sectarian rhetoric as well as a wide array of outlandish conspiracy theories.

The problem here is not simply that some analysts were ‘lost in translation’. People like Sondos Assem and Gehad El-Haddad, who is also the executive director of the Brotherhood’s “Renaissance” project, are supposed to represent a different kind of Muslim Brotherhood. As journalist Nick Kristof said in December 2011: “First, meet my hostess: Sondos Asem, a 24-year-old woman who is pretty much the opposite of the stereotypical bearded Brotherhood activist. Sondos is a middle-class graduate of the American University in Cairo [...].  She speaks perfect English, is writing a master’s thesis on social media, and helps run the Brotherhood’s English-language Twitter feed, @Ikhwanweb.”

This export brand of Muslim Brothers (or Sisters in this case) is meant to instate the idea of the presence of a young, progressive, open-minded stream within the Brotherhood. This idea has also been espoused by many within Egypt itself, but the reality is that the older, traditional Brotherhood members are the ones who run the show. Furthermore, it is questionable to even state that the younger generation is more open-minded. Dissidents who fall out of line too much can only seek their refuge in leaving the organization as opposed to ‘changing it from within’. This has happened with numerous young members of the organization as well as with one of its leaders, Abul Fotouh, who left to contend in the presidential race.

The faces of the revolution as they appeared in most media outlets, were young, tech-savvy activists who were quite progressive and ‘West-friendly’. The aforementioned image of younger Brotherhood members fit that narrative. All these progressive, young Egyptians, no matter their political background, would supposedly shed the bonds of patriarchy and embrace modernity and help Egypt embrace democracy in the process. That is ultimately what many wanted to believe and the Brotherhood simply catered to that wishful thinking.

Secondly, it is obvious how the Brotherhood depended on the naiveté and lack of political experience of its opponents to sway public opinion in its favour. In 2011, after the fall of Mubarak, parliamentary elections were held which resulted in an overwhelming victory for Islamists. Calling any opposition to the latter “elitist” or “in contempt of (the will of) the people” or “islamophobic” became normal and widespread and was sadly condoned, both explicitly and implicitly by Egypt watchers under the guise of political correctness.

During and after Egypt’s first post-revolutionary presidential elections, one of the strongest weapons used by the Brotherhood was the word “felool” (remnant of the old regime). Slowly but surely the word infiltrated all political discussions, lost its original meaning and was used to discredit all opponents of the Brotherhood. In the run-off round, accusations of being pro-Mubarak and “slaves of the (military) boots” were hurled at anyone who dared not support the Brotherhood candidate. Play on emotions was widely used as those voting for Shafik were said to be signing their ballots with the “blood of martyrs” and committing high treason against the revolution and the country.

But of course, as it would become clear later on, those who voted for Shafik did so for many different reasons and they weren’t all sympathetic to the Mubarak regime, let alone actual members of its network. It was the belief that it was Shafik – and not Morsi – who was the “lessor of the two evils” that played an important role in many voters’ decisions. Many had in fact predicted a lot of what the Brotherhood ended up doing once it came to power and it turns out they chose Shafik for very legitimate reasons after all. Yet all those valid concerns were successfully discredited by the Muslim Brotherhood and as usual most people took the bait.

When the theory that SCAF would define the outcome of the presidential elections by rigging them in favour of Shafik was proven to be utter nonsense, a new distraction was sought. And so the theory of the “deep state” as propagated by the Brotherhood started gaining momentum. According to that viewpoint, the old regime was still in control of the state through a presence in its institutions which it used to systematically fight the revolution personified in president Morsi. This theory served as a scapegoat which helped the Muslim Brotherhood escape responsibility for its failure to make political or economic progress. It also became used as dangerous justification for any of the president’s illegitimate decisions such as the constitutional declaration issued in November 2012 and the consequent presidential appointment of a new public prosecutor.

Thridly, the Brotherhood’s choice to help perpetuate the revolutionary – “felool” paradigm was one of its best strategies. The revolutionary group in Egypt, which includes the Muslim Bortherhood itself, is a very diverse one, with no unified ideology. Muslim Brotherhood, clear proponents of a religious state were able to bypass many revolutionaries’ rejection of such a state precisely because of that. When it comes to actually governing a country, there was no “revolutionary” way. After Mubarak fell, the differences between revolutionaries came to light. Instead of the revolutionary – felool dichotomy, alliances should have been formed based on the kind of state each group wanted, based on ideology instead of slogans. In that process, those who were against the revolution or those who were part of the NDP for various reasons (without being implicated in any criminal activities) should have been involved.

Finally, it is not acceptable for those claiming to fight orientalism, neo-colonialism, Islamophobia and racism to stifle criticism of the Brotherhood in the name of cultural relativism while ignoring the organization’s blatant disregard for human rights and the rule of law. You got the Brotherhood wrong because you allowed considerations of political correctness to make you ignore the facts. You got the Brotherhood wrong when you chose to see the world through the paradigms they propagated, ignoring the complexity of the political situation. You got the Brotherhood wrong when you agreed that their “illiberal democracy” is still a democracy worth supporting.

Egypt's President: Tweeting an Offline Nation | Atlantic Council

Egypt's President: Tweeting an Offline Nation | Atlantic Council

The first rule of sectarianism

Reports ranged from "Mob of angry Copts are at the cathedral protesting against the Pope (while a funeral was going on, nota bene)." to "The church is to blame for the crisis, after all, they dared to have a funeral at the cathedral." to "Christians used their guns, conveniently stored in the cathedral, to fire at MOI." to "The church planned this out to be a civil war". 

There are typically four stages to a full-on sectarian crisis in Egypt. First, you have the long, hard, arduous work of actually spreading sectarian venom in society. Luckily, there is no shortage of people willing to take that noble task upon themselves. Whether it is the ruling Muslim Brotherhood or one of its offshoots, or your random, friendly, neighborhood (TV-)preacher or your regular public figure, even a presidential candidate (dubbed "moderate Islamist" by the never-naive mainstream Western media), hate speech has become common. 

There is a constant flow of rumors about the Coptic 'state-within-a-state' and the alleged vast amount of weapons stored within the churches. These rumors are not only unsubstantiated, but the ones which qualify as clear & direct incitement to the use of violence are almost never condemned, let alone punished by authorities. The Egyptian mind has often proven fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Not only Copts, but all other minorities, whether Baha'i, Shia or atheist are sometimes considered agents for foreign powers out to stifle Egypt's mindblowing democratic/economic progress. 

Photo of the attack on the Coptic Cathedral - via Ahram Online

Anyhow, after the successful spread of such rhetoric, the second stage of a sectarian crisis can begin. All it needs is a little spark, nothing big: a girl and a boy who happen to be from different religious backgrounds are rumored to be in love, a fight between two merchants, a Facebook status update, a scribble on a wall etc. Anything really is enough to be construed as proof for those who believe the Copts are out to destroy the Egyptian state with weapons stored in their churches (apparently, a meager 10% of the population with a history of sectarian violence are very likely to be plotting something like that). 

So what happens? Random mob violence is what usually happens, and collective punishment of entire communities. A small group might start the violence, but then people join in, fired up by chants and calls (or media reports) which echo in the streets as shops are set on fire, houses are looted and people are literally forced to flee for their lives. Usually there are a few dead here and there. That's pretty much it really. 

The majority of people who are involved in these attacks are arguably not paid to do so, nor ordered to so by some political figure. They are people whose minds are saturated enough with that venomous broth which has been slowly simmering in society for a long time. It is not Mubarak or Morsi who order these attacks, as some like to believe. Yes, they bear some responsibility for either leaving criminals unpunished or actively promoting sectarianism, but the fact of the matter is that sectarianism is well-founded in society so it doesn't need a top-down approach. 

So the violence happens, the third stage can commence. No sectarianism without victim-blaming. The circle is full when the incendiary rhetoric that was used in stage one is repeated again, this time to justify the violence or to claim it was the Copts themselves who are at fault (or whichever community is attacked). 

When it comes to media, one important factor in stage three is reporting about the facts as "clashes" instead of attacks. Because it just sounds better or is more politically correct, or because journalists choose to ignore facts or not do their jobs. In the end, the facts are misrepresented as clashes between two equally responsible sides. This theory can be supported if one assumes people having a funeral (of victims of another sectarian incident, nota bene) in a cathedral is somehow an attack warranting a counter-attack with various weapons. 

Finally, the fourth and most important stage of any sectarian crisis commences. It is the part in which a lovely state representative with a wide smile tells us there is no sectarianism in Egypt. He then recounts stories from his youth in which he used to have a Muslim/Christian neighbor with whom he used to play in the street, or alternatively, depending on the level of apparent tolerance needed, in whose house he used to eat during feasts and special occasions.

The first rule of sectarianism: you do not talk about sectarianism. 

A Renaissance gone bad

Once upon a time far away in that mystical place called the Orient, there was a Kingdom in distress. So three Musketeers set out to save the land. One used to be a hero in his youth, many lifetimes ago, troubadours once roamed the land singing tales of his bravery. The second was known as the stuttering star.. in the West. His encounters with the powerful forces of the East couldn't prepare him for what he would meet in the Kingdom of Pharaohs. Long ago, he had worked with the Dark Lords (before they shed their white cloaks) thinking they were on his side, but they eventually turned on him. The third of the Musketeers was of the plebs, but he had one gift, his magical hair wooed the public, that special way he liked to comb it to the left made all the young maidens go wild.

The three Musketeers weren’t always so close, but once the Dark Lords rose to power, they decided to form a union in order to defeat them. Many were not pleased with this union of interests: Greybeard was one of them even though there was a time when he thought of joining in.It didn’t work out well in the end, partly because “The Four Musketeers” just doesn’t have a ring to it.

But that wasn’t the only reason, Greybeard had once been one of the elders in the Council of the Dark Lords, he had sworn an oath of fealty to the Supreme Lord of Darkness, a bond not easily broken. When Greybeard decided to disobey his Lord, he was banished from the pack, cursed to always roam the land, to be everything and nothing all at once. Not black nor white, but always in between, that was Greybeard’s place.

The Younglings were of little stature but with hearts of gold. They followed the tales of the three Musketeers closely, first with joy, but later with growing resentment and disappointment. It became clear the Musketeers were no match to the Dark Lords who had gold and could always count on the support of the Elephant Prince who lived in a far away land. The Dark Lords lived in a big castle on Mount Doom but always maintained close contact to their allies abroad.

The whole story started when the Younglings challenged the Fat King who had ruled the land for many many years. The Fat King was loved once, but as he grew older, his hearing weakened and so did his eyesight. After a long ride, he couldn’t land softly anymore.

When the Dark Lords felt his time had come, they joined the Younglings in their quest for power. The Dark Lords had been dreaming about this for a long time and it would become their first step to world-dominion. Once the Fat King fell, the true nature of the Dark Lords was revealed and they took off their white cloaks. In order to keep the Younglings on their side, they devised an evil scheme. They brewed a yellowy potion and gave it to the naïve Younglings who drank it joyously. The drink tasted good in the beginning, but as with many things in this story, later turned out to be an acidic poison.

And thus everyone waged battles against everyone in a war of all against all in the Kingdom of Pharaohs. Plagues hit the land and locusts left green fields behind as barren places of despair. Even in Mount Doom, confidence and arrogance had made way for discord and frustration. The Heir to the Supreme Head of the Council of Darkness was unhappy that his brother, the Spare, had become King. The Mad King, as he became known, felt unappreciated and unwanted. He had grown up jealous of his brother and thought becoming King would make up for his lost childhood. He used to threaten his subjects with things which cannot be named in a fairy tale such as this, suffice it to say that his threats only brought more misery upon him and his people and they lived happily never after.