Thatcher refuses to jump

I recently came across this video of an interview with former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In the context of the interview, guests are apparently asked to do something out of the ordinary, namely to jump up in the air. When the interviewer asks Thatcher to do this, she refuses and says the following: "I see no significance whatsoever of making a jump up in the air, I made great leaps forward, not little jumps in studios." 

Now, this video might be viewed as humorous by some, but what struck me in the quote I mentioned above is the simple wisdom contained in it. Thatcher contrasts jumping up and down with moving forward, in both cases there is movement, both are dynamic expressions but only one involves actual change in position.

This got me thinking about the Arab World and the aftermath of the uprisings that swept through the region in the course of the past two years. I wrote before about the mistake of insisting on a united revolutionary front which deludes the meaning of the revolution for the different groups and individuals who participated in it for different reasons and with different goals in sight. A lot of what has been happening by insisting on something which isn't possible in reality like that artificial unity is that people have been protesting, getting their hopes up and trying in vain, they have been jumping up and down. They are active, they feel they are doing something when in reality they haven't moved forward a bit.

In reality not much has changed in Egypt, in fact, things have gotten worse on many levels, and I think the problem is that so much energy and so much potential go to waste by insisting on using the same methods which have proven ineffective so many times in the past. It might be more exciting to jump up, to feel the euphoria of being detached from the ground, from reality, for just a little while. But when you come down again after jumping, you find you are still in the same place and the energy you used making that jump will have gone to waste.

Instead, it might be worth considering trying different methods to move forward, even if the steps are small and the process is slow. It might not be as invigorating, but it is most probably more consistent and will, in the long run, yield better results.

The interviewer, trying to convince Thatcher to do what even Gorbachev did, told Thatcher that her jumping up and down might be a chance to show people that she is actually doing something, not just talking. Thatcher answers saying that she wouldn't jump in a studio during an interview to please an audience, but is intent upon gaining and preserving their respect for her by working on the ground. There are different kinds of actions, some more appealing to those who seek entertainment and excitement, others less visible but perhaps much more valuable and lasting. We have been criticizing the political elite in Egypt, we see them daily on television, but when we look in reality they are nowhere to be found and their influence nowhere to be felt. It might be useful to reflect upon Thatcher's response when put in the situation she was put in.

What we need..

In between those lessons we learned, those we are learning right now and those we will soon forget, one thing is clear. Regardless of the revolution, regardless of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood, there is one task we who claim to fight for liberty are entrusted with. A movement needs to flood the public sphere with ideas that have thus far been hidden, buried under the failing political rhetoric of an outdated, uninspired and most importantly, uninspiring political elite. What we need is a fully-fledged wave that will leave nothing standing in the same way, through which the light will reach spheres which had known nothing but immobile darkness.

What we need is a liberal and secular movement in the Arab World. A movement which knows no boundaries, a movement that is non-sectarian. A movement much bigger than political parties, of which we have many now, names devoid of content and effect. What we need is a cultural, philosophical, social, economic and religious movement, one that is seen and felt in every town, in every village. A movement with no grandiose leaders, but passionate advocates in all corners of our region. A current that challenges the status quo without being in conflict with society itself. One that springs forth from within the heart of every community, one that grows from the pains of the reality of everyday life but which offers a completely new kind of medicine.

A movement made up of entrepreneurs, leaders young and old. Those who dare, those who can inspire. Those who have decided to let their ways be guided by the ever-shining light of human reason, and, if they so choose, an all-encompassing divine love. Those brave enough to take on bigotry head on, brave enough to shock, opening up discussions which many a tongue dared not touch. Creative, inventive souls, using whatever media they can get their hands on, looking to change their communities, their surroundings and eventually the world. We need creation instead of the constant imitations and limitations which we place on ourselves. A movement which wins the trust of those people who have known nothing but big promises with no one to keep them, disappointment after disappointment.

We no longer need the empty slogans, their time has passed. This must be bigger than politics, not to be confined in dusty old televisions in sitting rooms. We need well-versed, educated and committed people who will debate, challenge instead of blaming their failures on the other whoever it may be. To preach unalienable, God-given rights in face of those who preach slavery to a state speaking in His name. To know history, to know we are right, to believe our cause is just, our cause is worth the struggle and the fight. The awareness that we may only be planting seeds the fruits of which we will not see, but which could eventually spread in society the way fire spreads in a dried up forest. Because dried up it is, morally bankrupt and intellectually weak, it needs renewal. Not destruction for the sake of destruction, but weeding out that which is useless to make place for better things, for greater things. And one day, after the all-consuming fire eats away the old, green could appear again, it will be strong and resilient, aiming for the blue sky. And we may not live to see those seeds turn into something big, but we must know that it is our effort today that will make that even remotely possible in the future.

Those who have taken up masks on the political theatre, can keep them on. The curtains will soon close and the stage will be set for those who don't wear masks, who don't look down upon their societies unless to see their own feet on the ground, firmly connected to the land and its traditions and its history. Fully aware of who they are, not looking at things from a bird's eye perspective, but looking in the mirror, seeing themselves among others. Not those who go against the values for the sake of being different, no, those who dare change them, in themselves, in their own reflection above all else.

So far, we have only talked about events, about people, about theories of outlandish conspiracies. What we haven't talked about are ideas. Ideas, more powerful than anything, ideas which penetrate even hard surfaces, which will speak to that part in all of us which has for long been subjected to deafening silence. Bigger than a revolution and bigger than politics, what is needed is in each of us, a belief in a sacred freedom, a sacred right which belongs within our minds before it manifests itself in our surroundings. An idea. What we need... is to bravely proclaim the idea.

Challenges for Secularism in Egypt

"No religion in politics!" A sentence that is often used by those who call themselves secular and/or liberal (the term 'secular' has mostly been shunned and 'liberal' or 'civil' became umbrella-terms for all non-Islamists) on the Egyptian political scene. But what does it really mean and is it an adequate slogan to represent the secular stream in Egyptian society (which is itself a diverse group of course)? Any spectator of current Egyptian affairs will have noticed the uneasy relationship between religion and politics which has become an omnipresent subject in almost all political discussions. The following is an attempt to explore the issue from a different angle.

It is not unusual for Egyptians to hear political opinions being laid out while attending Friday prayers, in fact, there have been some reports recently of skirmishes occurring within mosques because some felt the sheikh had crossed a line by endorsing a political party or condemning its political opponents openly. The line between politics and religion however, is very flexible and vague in a country where according to some interpretations of religion, it means more than just religion and becomes "religion and state". In the Coptic Church, the Pope's political opinions were criticized not just for their content but for their supposed influence on Christians. In other churches, especially after the revolution, certain political opinions of the leaders are identifiable as well. 

Many of those who call themselves secular have criticized clergy or religious preachers for openly expressing political opinions, but are men of religion only confined to talking about religion at all times? Can't they express political opinions purely in their capacity of Egyptian citizens? The reality is that one cannot and should not stop these men from expressing their views on politics, that's not to say there can't be internal regulations forbidding the use of the pulpits for political campaigning. The true problem, after all, is not that some people are using religion in political speech, it's when religious rules are enforced using state power and that is, in fact, what seculars should be fighting. The new constitution, for instance, determines that a body of the renowned Islamic institution Al Azhar is given the power to interpret religious rules which, in their turn, are the main source of legislation in the country.

Ironically, so-called champions of secularism in Egypt have themselves used religion in their campaigning, the "Egyptian Bloc", for instance, which consisted of three secular parties, used this banner, which reads "The Quran is our Constitution", a slogan often used by religious parties and those calling for a religious state.

Source: http://www.almasryalyoum.com//sites/default/files/imagecache/highslide_zoom/photo/2011/12/27/69411/27122011320.jpg

In one of his videos (AR) which was used as part of a campaign calling on people to vote no on the new Constitution in December 2012, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, head of the secular Dostour Party, said: "we say no to the constitution because we want the Sharia".

In another instant, El Dostour party campaign flyers had been distributed to people attending Eid prayers. Muslim Brotherhood figure El Brens was reported saying that this signifies "the official burial of the saying 'No religion in politics'".

In a country where religion or at least the appearance or mention thereof play a big role in public life, can Egyptians have a meaningful political dialogue while completely shunning the subject? It is important that secular and/or liberals first know what it is exactly they are striving for and that they let go of slogans and/or methods which have proven unhelpful. As a political stream, they must reconcile with the idea that religion does play a big role in public life. Instead of calling for 'no religion in politics', it might be time to highlight the dangers of having religious rules forced on citizens by the state through legislation and the potential of abuse this has; while making clear that religion and religious freedom are respected. An important issue, for instance, has been the independence of Al Azhar. It should be made clear that no such independence can exist when the institution is given the power to interpret religious rules for the courts, thereby making it an important target for whoever is in power.

But above all, it is important for secular politicians to determine what they stand for on other issues, which will inevitably lead to their division in multiple parties based on their opinions on several social and economic questions (as opposed to one umbrella party that doesn't really stand for anything except its opposition to the Islamists). Political parties which are unable to reach citizens with well-researched programs and concrete plans for ways to take on the countries' many problems, will not get the citizens' votes. It is not enough to highlight the dangers of what the Islamist parties in Egypt are striving for, what is needed is an alternative. One that doesn't alienate the citizen nor patronize him or her and certainly one that respects that in Egypt, religion holds an important spot in many people's hearts. Egyptians don't need the government to teach them how to pray, instead, they require someone to create a legal environment where they can freely live and work, where economic growth can be achieved in a way that benefits all citizens, seculars should strive to be that someone. 

"Christians in Egypt" and other novelties..

Long-awaited guidelines, intended to help unsuspecting citizens identify members of a newly emerged sect in Egypt called "Christians", have finally been issued. The document describes "Christians" (or "Copts" as they sometimes call themselves) as a monolithic collective of people who have appeared in Egypt recently under very suspicious circumstances. Even though not much is known about this new religious community, the advent of which introduces the concept of "religious diversity" to a historically religiously homogeneous Egypt, scientists and analysts have been able to collect some vital data about them hoping to raise awareness about the dangers they pose to the country.

Christians have been observed to consume disproportionately high quantities of fava beans for long periods of time during the year thereby endangering Egypt's strategic fava bean reserves. Their exact origins are unknown, but they have been said to come from an undiscovered planet called "Diaspora" hoping to raise havoc in the country. They seem to dispense over an unlimited supply of money and weapons which they are known to store inside their houses of worship where they reportedly also keep their pet lions. 

Coptic deacons chanting at the Cathedral

In addition to that, investigations have revealed that they are also in possession of vast areas of land around some of their more remotely located houses of worship where they claim to spend their time in contemplative prayer. These so-called "monasteries", however, are suspected of being no more than a façade for clandestine practices, possibly hiding places for ultra-sophisticated nuclear arms factories. 

In a recent incident where their dangers have become apparent, Christians carried out a diabolical plan by which they led several Armed Personnel Carriers (APC's) to a trap using their own bodies as bait. It has to be mentioned that some insightful media outlets with a heightened sense of responsibility attempted to warn the general populace of the evil nature of that plot, though unfortunately to no avail. This incident has resulted in considerable damage to the wheels of the APC's coupled with high clean-up costs which, in turn, have had dramatic effects on the country's otherwise stable economy. Not to mention the stolen APC's which authorities still haven't been able to recover, they might be found hidden in the monasteries as well.

Although the majority of Christians have succeeded in perfecting their Arabic language skills, an attentive listener can, with a bit of effort, pick up on their distinct Christian accent. This trait has helped to identify them in recent times, permitting experts to determine their exact participation percentages in protests by listening to them chant. Aside from that, they seem to have developed a separate language which they presumably use to communicate with their foreign associates, most likely members of occult organizations.

Even though they have only been in the country for a relatively brief time, they have managed to blend in well to the extent that they were able to partake in the political process by pretending to be regular citizens. Although their numbers are very small, insignificant one might say, they seem to possess a supernatural ability to increase in numbers at public gatherings and protests, but also during presidential elections. It is still unclear whether these are the only supernatural abilities they possess, but there have been unconfirmed reports claiming they also have invisible fingers, which are known internationally to be means of thwarting democratic transitions.

Regulations obliging Christians to wear visible signs identifying themselves as "Christian" are expected soon so as to make it easier to discern between them and normal Egyptians. In the meantime, citizens are strongly advised to exercise extreme caution when dealing with those they suspect of being Christian until more is known about their kind and how to neutralize their threat. 

Disclaimer: This is a satirical piece intended to highlight the disturbing rise of the use of sectarian rhetoric in Egypt. 

Who Owns the Revolution?

We're approaching the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution and seeing how we are apparently still stuck with the same "revolutionary - felool" paradigm (felool being a term originally used for old regime remnants but one that has come to mean anyone who opposes revolutionaries and/or the Muslim Brotherhood), it is time to critically evaluate the positions of the different actors on the political stage. Many have claimed that the Egyptian revolution had distinct goals, clear ideals that can function as a way to measure and determine whether someone was revolutionary or not. However, it has become clear that the slogan "bread, freedom and social justice" can hardly fulfill that goal. Under the umbrella of the revolution were united people who hold completely different views about the very basics of political and societal organization. The only thing that united these people was a hatred for the old regime and this for various reasons which aren't all common to all of them. Some, for instance, don't seem to want to change the system as much as the people who were in it, while others hoped for a more thorough change. It is obvious in any case, that once that common enemy fell, the revolutionary movement disintegrated into several groups each holding on to a separate meaning of the revolution and claiming to 'continue the fight' for its sake. 

Celebrations in Tahrir Square after Mubarak stepped down

One of the accusations hurled at the Muslim Brotherhood was that they 'stole' the revolution (a variation has them 'riding' the revolutionary wave). This rhetoric, though comforting for revolutionaries who feel frustrated they couldn't transform their ideas into reality, must be viewed with scrutiny. For what does it mean to 'steal the revolution'? Regardless of when they joined the street protests, the Muslim Brotherhood at one point also stood in the squares and also screamed for bread, freedom and social justice, also demanding that Mubarak step down. Why would their interpretation of the revolution be considered inferior to that of the (other) 'revolutionaries'? Why can't the Islamists claim that the establishment of a theocratic state is in fact a way of fulfilling the demands of the revolution as they understand them? 

Similarly, as Maikel Nabil was talking at a university in Israel, some have taken it upon themselves to deprive him of the 'revolutionary' label. He has no right to call himself a revolutionary, according to them, because his beliefs aren't in accordance with theirs. And this regardless of whether he was in the squares like them, screaming the same words and calling for the downfall of Mubarak as well. 

What many fail to understand is that the only thing the people in the square had in common was a hatred for the Mubarak regime and a desire for change. What direction that change would go and what exactly it would entail wasn't something they all agreed on, not by far. There were different factions from the beginning, people who have little in common. Most well-known pictures of Tahrir square which were spread on the media show the full square from afar, even most videos show the same image of a unified collective screaming loudly with one voice. But zoom in and you see the true picture, with all its political colors and nuances. A Salafi, a revolutionary socialist and a classical liberal all stood together, but their unity would end once their common goal was achieved, their visions about the post-Mubarak Egypt diverge in an extreme way. An important side note here is that not all those who hated the corruption of the Mubarak regime were in the squares. The so-called "Kanaba party", people who didn't really join in street action, aren't all one block either. The reality is much more complicated than the simplified black and white version many are advocating. There were those who, while reviling the system and the way things were going, didn't believe a revolution would bring any relief. Yes, there were those who believed slow, piecemeal reform would eventually yield better results than what they considered an uncalculated, risky regime change. 

When the second round of the presidential elections was held, many dubbed it the ultimate test to determine someone's revolutionary score. Nevermind the fact that there is no such thing as a "unified political program for the revolution" upon which a so-called "unified candidate" can get all the revolutionary votes. And indeed, Morsi, Sabbahi and Abul Fotouh were all considered revolutionary candidates by their followers, even though their respective political programs differed greatly. In the end, Morsi was dubbed "the revolutionary candidate" even though his plans for the country were fundamentally and completely different from those of a liberal revolutionary or a socialist revolutionary. And that same "revolution" which was used to usher in the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, was later on used to justify the way they ruled the country. It was somehow expected that all revolutionaries accept this in silence or be dubbed felool, remnants of the old regime, supporters of corruption. They fell victims to the dichotomy they created wereby one is either a revolutionary who stand for justice or a felooli who supports corruption and nepotism. 

Well, it is time to let go of naive simplifications of reality and start realizing the complexity and diversity that exists in the Egyptian case. In the end, what counts should be the actual ideological opinions and concrete plans for the country the person or group in question has. This is the divide we should focus on, this is the divide upon which parties and coalitions should be built, not the empty revolutionary - felool dichotomy! It is outrageous that those who didn't support the revolution or who supported Shafik should be treated as morally inferior to the so-called revolutionaries. Not after it became clear that some revolutionaries would in fact use that revolution to usher in a new age of dictatorship, this time in the form of a totalitarian theocracy. Some of those who opposed the revolution from the beginning and who voted for Shafik later on did so exactly because they had predicted this scenario. The vast majority of those Egyptians aren't criminals, nor people who approve of corruption, they are simply people who disagreed with the 'revolutionaries' on how this country should be run and how its problems should be solved. Try and punish the criminals of the old regime, but don't alienate those who did what they thought was best for their country and continue to do so. They don't need to justify themselves or apologize for breaching the "revolutionary" code in order to be accepted among the ranks of those legitimately opposing the current regime.

Egypt now stands before a difficult struggle. A struggle for freedom from state oppression, a struggle against a government that wishes to put itself above the law, a regime that would trample basic rights under the pretext of 'purging' state and society from 'evil elements'. In this fight, the distinction shouldn't be based on the meaningless revolutionary - felool divide, but on something more pertinent in face of the current threats.  As I write this, a quote by George Orwell comes to mind, one that seems to have been written exactly for the situation we're in today: "The real division is not between conservatives and revolutionaries but between authoritarians and libertarians."

Constitutional Highway to Theocracy

It is no secret that the Egyptian Islamists (most importantly represented in the Constitional Assembly by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Da'awa Salafiya) who, together with clear sympathizers, possessed more than half the seats in the Constitutional Assembly, all want a religious state, a theocracy of sorts, a system where purely religious rules are enforced using state power. This demand has been at the heart of their chants in protests, their parties' political programs and their members' words whenever they appear in the media. In fact, during the discussions in the Constitutional Assembly, some members of that group wanted to remove the word "democratic" from the draft altogether, because it would imply putting the people's will above that of God (cf. infra).

In this article, I shall discuss some of the constitutional loopholes and mines through which the drafters wished to implement their plans of having the government play a big, intrusive role in the lives of citizens by invoking religion. Let it be clear that this article does not aim to belittle the role of religion in both private and public life in any way nor is the point to discuss a particular religion in se. I simply mean to clarify what the draft constitution entails and how it will be interpreted so as to counter claims by some so-called experts claiming it is not very controversial or that protests against it are exaggerated. It is therefore that I would like to discuss Dr. Yasser el Borhamy's words (AR), published by "Ana El Salafy" (I, the Salafi)*, a famous Salafi website. After having finished the constitutional draft, El Borhamy, who is a prominent Salafi member of the Constitutional Assembly, is seen in the video defending and explaining the draft to fellow Salafi sheikhs, among whom the prominent Sheikh Mohammed Hassan. The reason for this, was that there were some attacks on the draft from within the Islamist front itself.

Dr. Yasser El Borhami, member of the Constituent Assembly

El Borhamy starts off by stating the importance of article 2 of the constitution which proclaims that Islam is the religion of the state and the principles of Islamic law (Shariah) are the main source of legislation. It is important to note that Salafis believe the article, as it was interpreted in the past by the Supreme Consitutional Court (SCC), had a range that was too narrow for their wishes.

El Borhamy then clarifies that although only 50% of the Assembly were Islamists (while mentioning that Islamists should have had more than 70% but agreed to 50% in the end in order to avoid problems with SCAF and the SCC), many members from the "non-Islamist" group were in fact also "religious" and supported the "Islamist project". He concludes that there was thus a majority for Islamists in the end.

He continues by saying that they wished to replace the word "democratic" in article 1 of the draft with the word "shura". The word "citizenship" was also considered a problem by some Islamists, because, just like "democracy", it was suspected of being unislamic. However, since the SCC had interpreted "citizenship" to mean that citizens feel they belong to one nation and that their interests are interlinked, El Borhamy explains that it contains nothing that goes against religion per se. In the end, they decided to keep the word "democratic" in the first article, but define it by adding "shura" to its explanation in article 6. The reason for this addition was to make clear that democracy in Egypt would have a "ceiling", that there would be primacy for God's law (of course, always as interpreted by humans) over the will of the people.

The next article discussed is the controversial article 2. According to Salafis, the article had been void of meaning and was merely "decor" in the past. It is therefore that they wished to rewrite the article so as to make its range broader. In the end and after much discussion, the Islamists suggested  adding article 219 which defines the words "principles of shariah". It is this article, which is contained in the final draft, which the Salafis consider a "red line" as they feel it is the article that defines the entire constitution. El Borhamy even stated that adding article 219 is better than cancelling the word "principles" in article 2 (which was a previous Islamist demand) so that it becomes "Shariah (and not just its principles) is the main source of legislation".

Afterwards El Borhamy addresses some complaints he has heard about article 43 which guarantees freedom of belief. He points out that article 81 which concludes the chapter about "Rights and Freedoms" in the draft is the solution to the problem. This article stipulates that the exercise of rights and freedoms contained in the constitution must be in accordance with basic principles laid down in the chapter about "State and Society", which, as he explains, entail the principles of shariah contained in article 2 and explained in article 219. He mentions that Christians had objected to adding that article, but that it passed despite that. He exclaims that Anba Bola (the church representative) had the audacity to object to the article just because it refers to the shariah. An important quote that I'd like to make the reader aware of is El Borhamy saying "This constitution has restrictions [on rights and freedoms] that have never been included in any Egyptian constitution before."

When it comes to Bahai's, El Borhamy mentions that they will be able to legally exclude them from the application of the constitutional articles related to rights and freedoms.

Another essential point of discussion was an article El Borhamy found to be a most terrible article, namely article 76. The wording of this article in the old constitution is one most jurists in the world are familiar with, "nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege" or "no crime and no punishment without a law". These words are considered fundamental safeguards of freedom and rule of law and are included in most constitutions in the world. El Borhamy explains that this article is dangerous because it would mean that consensual adultery, bank interests and sodomy wouldn't be considered crimes. Because all jurists in the Assembly were adamant on including that article in the constitution, according to El Borhamy, they were forced to include it. However, with the help of Dr. Selim El Awa (a former candidate for the presidency), they managed to change the wording. The altered article states "no crime, no punishment without a provision in the law or the constitution". El Borhamy explains that this alteration will enable them to include article 2 of the constitution and its explanation in article 219 as grounds for incrimination, making it possible to try and punish citizens for crimes not expressly mentioned in the law!

Finally, El Borhamy repeats something he had said quite a few times before, namely that article 219 which explains the meaning of the "principles of shariah" as mentioned in article 2, is a "red line", not open to discussion. He adds that this article was accepted by the "Committee for Senior Scholars".

I would like to point out that the "Committe for Senior Scholars" which is part of Al Azhar, is mentioned in an article El Borhamy didn't address in the video. Article 4 stipulates that it is obligatory to ask the opinion of the "Committee for Senior Scholars" in Al Azhar in all things related to the shariah. The importance of this article cannot be overestimated. If a judge is presented with a case in which someone is tried for an act which isn't punishable by law, but which (according to the altered article 76) may be punishable by purely religious rules, a judge would be forced to ask the opinion of the Committee. Now, although article 4 doesn't expressly say that the opinion of the Committee is binding, it will be so de facto since it is unimaginable that many judges would go against the decision of a body of Al Azhar (considered one of the most respected religious institutions in the Arab world) when it comes to religious matters. This is merely one example of the possible effects of this article.

This constitution puts the power to interpret things related to the shariah with the "Committe for Senior Scholars" thereby putting them not only above the courts, but also above the legislator. A group of religious men from Al Azhar will have a say in how the country is run and how laws are applied and those who claim to be for the independence of Al Azhar must be aware that no such thing can exist when they are so close to power. So both religious texts (including human interpretations thereof, obviously) and certain religious scholars are intentionally placed above the law and the constitution. Now, call me alarmist for saying that this constitution paves the way for theocracy...

This article doesn't contain all the reasons why this constitutional draft should be rejected, the draft contains many dangers in other chapters about private property, the separation of powers and judicial independence for instance. However, I hope it does give a clearer view on the actual meaning of this draft and its possible consequences. It may also be necessary to note that, in this context, it might not be those protesting the draft and the referendum who are against democracy.

*I'd like to thank Samuel Tadros for bringing that video to my attention. 

Revolutionary Felool

They are many and their numbers seem to be growing daily. They used to complain about the corruption that was so typical of the Mubarak era, they wanted change but didn’t quite know how to realize it. Some dreamt of a revolution, but thought such a thing was impossible in Egypt and would remain a dream. When the anti-Mubarak protests broke out in January of 2011, they supported them from day one, some stood in Tahrir, faced the hardships and finally saw before them a new Egypt, a fresh start they could actually realize. They chanted “down with the regime”, some of them were wounded or know someone who was killed by security forces. They cried tears of relieve and disbelief when Mubarak stepped down, thinking they were finally ready to take a step forward, this was their time to reclaim their country.

This is the story of many regular Egyptians. Not professional “activists” or anything like that, just young people dreaming of a better future, hoping they wouldn’t have to immigrate to find better chances outside of their country. Middle aged men and women who hoped this would mean their children could grow up in a country where they can develop their talents, where they can live safely and peacefully.

A scene from the movie "Birds of darkness" which was often used to symbolize the dilemma of the ordinary citizen having to choose between a regime representative and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. 

The group I’m speaking about were people who hoped for progress, true change in the government apparatus, rule of law and societal tolerance. They wanted a stop to the age of stagnation they felt Egypt was stuck in, they wanted technological advancements, better research facilities and education. They dreamt of decent healthcare and economic progress.

But instead, they found that many of the loudest voices speaking in the name of the revolution didn’t stand for these things at all. They found people hoping to limit freedoms even more, people whose only goal was to seek out confrontation with security forces even if it didn’t help their cause and people whose economic ideas would usher in disasters for a country with an already fragile economy. They found newly emerged political figures fighting for a few minutes on-air, spewing nonsense and outlandish conspiracy theories to justify themselves. They found “leaders” going the wrong way, cooperating with the wrong people and trusting promises they shouldn’t put their confidence in.

They were alienated and ridiculed when they started to doubt “the revolutionaries” and their methods. They were called “felool” when they didn’t support a protest or sit-in they felt would end up in violence and loss of lives and wouldn’t have any positive results whatsoever. They were called “elitist” when they didn’t agree with the mainstream opinions and explanations for recurring violence.

They were disappointed when they found a majority of so-called “human rights activists” blindly supporting a law that would ban a citizen from exercising his political rights. They were outraged that those who were once calling for rule of law were ready to ignore correct court decisions because they didn’t meet their “revolutionary” expectations and even started contemplating cancelling that court altogether.

And then, when it was time to choose a new president, they were shocked at how some “revolutionaries” naively supported a man who came from an organization which they felt represented everything they were against. Where they wanted freedom, he wanted less freedom in the name of protecting ‘public morals’. Where they wanted citizenship, his organization had sectarian tendencies. Where they wanted rule of law, he was ready to plainly ignore or go against court decisions. Where they wanted an end to corruption and hypocrisy, his organization had a record of lies and fabrications. It’s not that some people voted for Morsi because they believed him to be the best choice, the problem, for them, was that some people voted for him solely to thwart Shafik and his supporters, not because they believed he was the better candidate. The problem, for them, was that a man like Morsi, with the background and history of his organization, could be referred to as “the revolution’s candidate”!

Some of them decided not to vote at all or to void their ballots, deciding that a vote for either candidate would constitute an immoral act. Others decided to vote for Shafik because they believed he was the hero who would save the country and put it back on the right track. Others voted for Shafik because they felt Morsi was the worst choice and Shafik was the lesser of two evils and they had a responsibility to make a choice.

They are there, they have been alienated, but it seems that they are growing in numbers. Initially pro the revolution and against the Mubarak regime and all it stood for, they now feel the current regime might be/is even worse than the Mubarak regime. They no longer see themselves in that “revolution” which was said to be represented by Morsi. They no longer support a fight they feel is not for the good of the country anymore, but for the good of one organization. From “revolutionary” to “felool”, this is the story of those who lost faith in this revolution...